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Abstract
This paper considers the professional treatment 
manufacturers to participate in emissions trading under 
the condition of the emissions trading which establish the 
supply chain between the manufacturers and the providers 
of professional sewage treatment. By using the strategy 
analysis method, under the certain conditions this study 
analyze the difference of the outsourcing decisions on the 
treatment price fluctuating. This study also conclude that 
the expected return of the supply chain on the strategy 
of all manufacturers choose to outsourcing the sewage 
treatment is less than the expected return on the integration 
supply chain strategy. Also, this research documents the 
existence of the supply chain. The conclusions of this 
paper contribute to the establishment of emissions trading 
under the conditions of wastewater treatment supply chain 
and future contributing to the sewage treatment industry 
with the application.
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INTRODUCTION
Franchising is a major mode of using and operating 
mechanisms in the current reform of public utilities 
such as sewage treatment in China (YANG, 2010). 
These patterns changed in the past investment in sewage 
treatment by the government exclusive, exclusive building 
and self-management system, and gradually formed a 
unified planning and management in the government, 
the diversified investment, multi-mode operation and the 
broad participation of society new system. Li Fang, Huang 
Tongcheng, Gu Mengdi and Wang Mengguang (2006) 
discussed the use of two-stage game model of emissions 
trading under the control of the object identified, efforts to 
control the arrangement of the penalties for illegal sewage 
behavior and effective control of the target design and 
other issues (LI, HUANG, GU, 1978). Harford (1978) put 
forward a simple theoretical model in pollution emission 
standards and tax firm behavior under the conditions 
(Harford. J. D., 1978). Keeler (1991) studied the pollution 
discharge enterprise through the concrete fine function 
model to carry out the pollution discharge standard to 
evade taxes incompletely the behavior, when the control 
cannot obtain coordinates completely, to the pollution 
discharge power transaction and the standard carries 
on the concrete comparison (Keeler A G., 1991). Malik 
(1990) and Li Shoude with Huang Tongcheng (2003) 
discussed the general enforcement of violations under 
the emissions trading market and its control mechanisms 
(Malik, Aroun S., 1990; DU, DONG, LIANG, ZHANG, 
2009). Sun Wei (2010) introduces the pollution discharge 
reduction quantity and the transaction scale of charges 
parameter, the application real options method, has 
established the non-transaction expense separately and has 
under the transaction expense condition to monopolize 
the manufacturer anti-pollution technology investment 
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decision-making model (SUN, SHANG, LIANG, 2010). 
Yang Song (2010) based on the economical optimality, 
fairness and the production continuous principle, has 
constructed an initial pollution discharge power free 
assignment multi-objective decision making model, has 
carried on the discussion to this model related nature.(LI, 
HUANG, 2003) Li Fang (2006) analyzed in the sewage 
treatment to purify the cost to the enterprise the influence, 
established the enterprise to produce the optimized 
model, obtained had under the emissions quota most 
superior production strategy. (WANG, LIU, 2008) Most 
of papers in the references mainly studied the sewage 
treatment question under the pollution discharge power 
transaction condition between the pollution discharge 
enterprise or the pollution discharge enterprise and the 
government, The paper (WANG, LIU, 2008) tell us the 
general manufacturer non-core spare part outside package 
of strategy question. In this paper, giving a professional 
treatment to participate in emissions trading model for 
sewage treatment, sewage treatment research findings to 
promote the industrialization of a reference value, based 
on the literatures above.
1.  MODEL NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS
Consider a single manufacturer and single sewage 
treatment enterprises consisting of a single period of the 
supply chain. Manufacturer produces a single product, 
and a certain amount of sewage discharged. manufacturers 
could either process polluted water by themselves or 
outsource to specialized wastwater treatment plant through 
pollution rights trading system. The market demand be 
faced by the manufacturer is stochastic, but probability 
distribution is known. χ 1 is the manufacturer’s production 
capacity (in production that), as the manufacturer’s core 
production capacity for decision-making variables. is 
the product manufacturer’s market demand, D  ≤ χ 1; y is 
random variable of D, λ(y) = Y is the amount of sewage 
discharge of the finished product y.  is the production 
function. Without loss of generality, we consider the 
discharge per unit of production volume λ (λ  > 0), that 
is Y= λ (y ) = λy ; Apparently the manufacturer’s total 
sewage discharge λ(D), and λ(D) ≤ λ(χ 1) = X1. Set X2 the 
manufacturer to handle the sewage capacity, so there is 
X2= λ -1(χ 2), 0 ≤ χ 2 ≤ D  ≤ χ 1 χ 1 as the manufacturer’s sewage 
treatment capacity, is non-core production capacity, 
but also decision variables. f(*), F(*) respectively is 
the produce market demand probability density and the 
distribution function. p is the manufacturer’s unit sales 
price, unit of emissions trading , ps is emissions trading 
market price of the product manufacturer or sewage 
treatment business unit of purified water discharge of 
sewage obtained the right to save. After α  is the pollution 
discharge power which the product manufacturer or 
the sewage treatment business unit sewage withdrawal 
purifies obtains saves, also is called the sewage treatment 
purification level, 0 ≤ α  < 1. cc is the manufacturer unit 
product production cost, cc(α) is the product manufacturer 
under purification level unit sewage withdrawal processing 
cost, continuously ,differentiable, and cc(0) = 0,  cc(1) = ∞, 
cc'(α) > 0, cc"(α) > 0; cs(α) is sewage treatment business 
under the purification level α  unit sewage withdrawal 
purification processing cost, continuously differentiable 
also satisfies cs(0) = 0, cs(1) = +∞, cs'(α) > 0, cs"(α) > 0. 
∏m(X ) is the manufacturer’s expected profit, ∏m(X *) is 
the maximum expected return of the manufacturer, ∏s(X) 
is the expected return of sewage treatment enterprises, 
∏s(X *) is the maximum expected return of the sewage 
treatment enterprise. ∏t(X) = ∏m(X)+ ∏s(X) is the overall 
supply chain benefits in distributed systems. ∏t '(X) is the 
expected return when the sewage treatment business and 
professional enterprises as a whole . We have some of the 
assumptions are as follows:
Assumption 1: Emissions trading market is improve 
and perfect, the manufacturers and the professional 
treatment providers can enter the market for emissions 
trading at any time, is the unit price of emissions trading 
in emissions trading market .
Assumption 2: Supply chain parties (the manufacturers 
and the wastewater treatment providers) are neutral 
attitude toward risk, that decision is based on both their 
expected revenue maximization.
Assumption 3: The Manufacturer’s purpose is to 
complete the sewage treatment emission reduction targets 
for government issued, not to sell emission rights.
Assumption 4: Professional sewage treatment capacity of 
sewage treatment business unlimited. 
Assumption 5: Do not consider the product manufacturer 
lead time.
Assumption 6: cs(α) < cc(α).
2.  MODELING AND ANALYSIS 
Manufacturer’s decision-making process is: first, the 
core product in the beginning of the production capacity 
and sewage treatment capacity to make decisions; the 
second step, according to market demand determine the 
actual situation of the number of wastewater treatment 
outsourcing. Because of Y= λ (y ) = λy , and f (y ) is the 
probability density of demand random variable Y, is 
g(Y)= f(Y)                  . Let us make the following tag: 
λ(χ 1) = X1, λ(χ 2) = X2, X = (χ 1, χ 2), (X1, X2) = λX . So, the 
expected profits of the manufacturers and the sewage 
treatment business should be:
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strategy III. When μ 1
* > 0, μ 2
* = 0,we can get  the 
following result from(3):
                                                       , and because μ 1
* = − psλF(χ 1
*) + 
ps − cc(α )λ , χ 1* > 0, μ 1* > 0, F(χ 1*) < 1 so we have the 
following inequalities:
ps'ps" =                     , So there must be ps'  < 0, ps" > 0, and 
we can get the following results:
Lemma. If 0 < λ <    , than the expression (1) is a 
concave function in Rc = {(χ 1, χ 2)\ χ 1, χ 2 ≥ 0, χ 1 ≥ χ 2}.
Proof: The calculation yields:
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will be the positive definite matrix. Therefore, ∏m(X) is a 
strictly concave function based on the Rc. The Lemma has 
been Proved.
We use the Kuhn - Tucker conditions for solving 
the most advantages of the equation (1). That is, the 
manufacturer’s optimal decision on treatment. The 
formula (1) standard form deformation as follows:
                                                                     
                                                                                   (3)
We can get the manufacturer’s integration strategy by 
solving equations (3):
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* = 0, μ 2
* > 0 χ 2
* = 0, we can get 
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*= F-1                    and μ 2* = cc(α)λ − ps from (3), And 
because χ 1
* ≥ 0, μ 2
* > 0, so that 0 < ps ≤                            . 
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We can get the following results from the latter two in
equalities:                     . The first inequality can be 
organized into the following inequality:
                                                                                                Let
                                                                                 ,
                                                                       Obviously 
∆> 0, then ω(ps) = 0 has two unequal real roots. May wish 
to assume there roots are ps', ps" and ps'  < ps". Because 
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To solving the above Inequalities we have the 
following results:
When λ  > 1,                                              ; When λ  < 1 and
∆ ≥ 0,                                             , if ∆ < 0, ps will be no 
solutions; When λ  = 1,                                . 
strategy IV  When μ1
* > 0, μ2
* > 0, the following results 
can be deduced from equation (3):
χ 1
* =  χ 1
* = 0,                    and ps(λ − 1) > p  − cc − cc(α)λ  and 
because               so we can get the further results that: If 
λ  > 1, then                                                             ; If λ  = 1, 
then ps > p  − cc; and If λ  < 1, then ps will be no solutions.
Proposit ion1. If  the manufacturers to choose 
outsourcing all the task of sewage treatment, the maximum 
expected profit of supply chain in a decentralized system 
would be less than the maximum expected profit of supply 
chain in integration model.
Proof: In the decentralized system, there must be. ps > 
cs(α). When all of the sewage treatment companies have 
chosen outsourcing, we know that from the integration 
strategy I χ 2
* = 0 and                                      . Thus the 
operation maximum expected gain of the supply chain 
would be that as follow:
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In the case of integration, χ 2 = 0 , and no trading of 
emission rights, that is ps = cs(α). At this point, the supply 
chain expected profit is
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The formula(12)apparently to meet the lemma 
conditions available. From the first order conditions, the 
yield optimal product of ∏m'(X) should be
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To consider formulas(12) and (13), we know that the 
optimal supply chain expected profit after coordination, 
that is
                                                                                 (12)
So                                                  , or
As the maximum expected income gains between the 
two sides after coordination are the increase than those in 
pre-coordinated, and                                , therefore
                                           so we have
                                           .
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as the length of the supply chain can be coordinated. It 
is very clearly that the length of the supply chain can be 
coordinated be greater than 0 by Proposition 1. The proof 
is now complete.
CONCLUSION
(1) According to the above analysis, it is not difficult 
to see that professional treatment providers in order 
to enter the sewage treatment market should strive to 
achieve cc(α )λ  − ps > 0, allowing the manufacturer to 
select the integration strategy I, that is outsource all of 
its wastewater treatment business. This need to reduce 
treatment costs, and to reduce the emissions trading price 
to the following bottom line the manufacturer can select 
the integration strategy I.
(2) The government should waste water treatment 
industry’s supply chain to provide the necessary legal 
conditions. The first is to increase the energy saving law 
enforcement, sewage discharge limits, the implementation 
of total control; The second is to establish emissions 
trading mechanisms, so that polluting industries to buy 
emission rights according to their own emission reduction 
benefits, while professional sewage treatment enterprises 
can make full and timely sale of emission rights. The third 
is to use administrative means to control the price through 
emissions trading sewage treatment benefit distribution 
mechanism, through the purification of the levels of 
sewage treatment standards for sewage treatment, thus 
promoting the orderly operation of sewage treatment 
industry.
(3) The businesses of sewage treatment are likely 
to cheat the government arbitrarily reduced wastewater 
treatment standards in order to gain their maximum 
economic benefits. The  is a indicator controlled by the 
government, therefore, the government can take effective 
measures to control the  and prevent professional sewage 
treatment enterprises the behavior to get the benefits of 
enterprise through damage public interest.
(4) In this study, no government department, the 
manufacturer (sewage enterprises), professional treatment 
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It is clearly that the formula (9) satisfies the lemma 
conditions. To consider
                                                                   , then we will 
have                                       ,
and thus ,the maximum expected return of the supply 
chain in the integration case should be
                                                                                         (8)
The inequality                  or          can be proved easily. 
Let
                                                                                         (9) 
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To consider the formulas (6),(8)and(9), we have 
                                                                                  
This completes the proof.
Proposition 2. In this paper’s conditions, if the 
manufacturer to choose strategy I, then there will exist 
a constant , let the supply chain coordination under the 
following contract.
(i) The manufacturer pay a fixed fee to the professional 
treatment providers in a period advance;
(ii) During the period, the professional treatment 
providers to sale their emission rights with cost-price to 
the manufacturer, that is ps = cs(α), and the number does 
not exceed the maximum set by the manufacturer at the 
beginning emissions.
Proof: Just prove the existence of a constant ,let the 
sum of the revenue and earnings both of the supply 
chain after being coordinated equals to the profit of the 
supply chain in integration. ∏m'(X) is the expected profit 
function after coordination of the manufacturer (sewage 
companies) and ∏s' (X ) respect the expected profit 
function after coordination of the professional sewage 
treatment business. 
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providers around the emissions trading price of the 
conduct of the game. In addition, government departments 
how to use emissions trading prices, the level of sewage 
purification and sewage charges through the sewage 
treatment industry on the implementation of effective 
policy guidance and regulation, is the next step of the 
important issues.
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